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UNITED STATES V. WEST: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IS 
NOT CHILD’S PLAY 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Selling drugs is bad, but selling drugs near places where children 
play is really bad.  This was the thought process behind federal lawmak-
ers’ decision to enact The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 
(“CCCA”).
1
 One provision of the CCCA, 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (“the play-
ground rule”), enhances punishment for drug transactions that occur 
within 1000 feet of a playground.
2
 According to the statute, a “play-
ground” is an outdoor facility that has at least three separate apparatus 
“intended for the recreation of children.”
3
 But, what exactly is an “appa-
ratus”? The statute does not define it and courts have struggled to deter-
mine its meaning. Most recently, the court in U.S. v. West interpreted the 
playground rule and held that Holcom Park, near where the defendant 
engaged in illicit drug activity, contained “three separate apparatus” nec-
essary to constitute a “playground.”
4
   
This Comment explores the shortcomings of the West court’s analy-
sis.  Overall, the West court reached the right result for the right reason 
despite flawed legal analysis. Criminals convicted of selling drugs near 
places where children gather ought to receive increased punishments 
because that is what Congress intended when it enacted the playground 
rule.  
II. MAJORITY OPINION 
The West court began its rationale by recognizing that two appa-
ratus already existed in Holcom Park.
5
  Following the court’s recognition 
of two apparatus in Holcom Park, as well as a summary of the split 
among the federal circuit courts of appeals, the majority began its statu-




First, the Tenth Circuit began its interpretation by examining the 
statute’s plain language and debated whether to employ ejusdem generis 
as an interpretive aid that might assist in understanding Congress’s in-
  
        1. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 860 (2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at § 860(e)(1) (“The term ‘playground’ means any outdoor facility (including any 
parking lot appurtenant thereto) intended for recreation, open to the public, and with any portion 
thereof containing three or more separate apparatus intended for the recreation of children including, 
but not limited to, sliding boards, swingsets, and teeterboards.). 
 4. United States v. West, 671 F.3d 1195, 1197 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 5. Id. at 1199. 
 6. Id. 
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tent.
7
 The majority’s main concern throughout its analysis was to make 
sure its statutory interpretation did not defeat congressional intent.
8
 The 
court stated that Congress’s intent in enacting the playground rule was to 
“create drug-free zones by increasing punishment for drug transactions 
that occur near places where children gather.”
9
  Ultimately, the court 
declined application of the principle of ejusdem generis because it would 
obscure congressional intent.
10
 More specifically, the court agreed with 
the Ninth Circuit that an “application of ejusdem generis would narrow 
Congress’s definition of ‘children’ from people ‘under 18 years of age’ 
to those young enough to be able to play on swingset[s], slides, and tee-
terboards.”
11
 The court explained that while many teenagers do not play 
on sliding boards, swingsets, or teeterboards, they are considered “chil-
dren” because the definition in the statute is very clear, and to say other-
wise would conflict with Congress’s intent.
12
 In further support of its 
decision, the court cited cases that reject the use of interpretive aids when 




Next, the court cited a statement made by then Judge Alito regard-
ing the use of ejusdem generis when interpreting contracts to support its 
position.
14
 “In the analogous context of interpreting a contract . . . ‘the 
rule of ejusdem generis applies only if the provision in question does not 
express a contrary intent.’”
15
 Therefore, the court ruled that the doctrine 
of ejusdem generis is inapplicable since the phrase “including, but not 
limited to” plainly expresses a contrary intent.
16
 
The majority ended its opinion concluding that a baseball field with 
a backstop constituted an “apparatus.”
17
 Because a baseball field with a 
backstop constituted an “apparatus,” the majority held that Holcom Park 
falls under the category of a “playground” within the meaning of the 
playground rule since the park “is an outdoor public facility containing 
three or more separate apparatus intended for the recreation of children 
including, but not limited to, sliding boards, swingsets, and teeter-
boards.”
18




 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1200. 
 9. Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 1997 WL 811737, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 15, 1997)). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. (quoting United States v. Migi, 329 F.3d 1085, 1088 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. (citing United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 681–82 (1950); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 227 (2008)). 
 14. Id. at 1200-01. 
 15. Id. (quoting Cooper Distrib. Co. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 63 F.3d 262, 278 (3d. Cir. 
1995)). 
 16. Id. at 1201. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 19. Id. 
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III. REASONS WHY THE MAJORITY SHOULD HAVE RULED IN FAVOR OF 
THE DEFENDANT 
The West majority should have ruled in favor of the defendant be-
cause it ignored plain statutory language, introduced an ambiguous defi-
nition of “apparatus” that muddied an already murky issue, failed to take 
into consideration generally accepted concepts of a playground, and ig-
nored the fact that the amenities in Holcom Park are not intended solely 
for the recreation of children. 
First, the West majority should not have ignored the three specific 
examples of apparatus (sliding boards, swingsets, and teeterboards) in-
cluded in the playground rule’s definition of “playground.”
20
 In an effort 
to understand what other apparatus qualify under the statute, the majority 
sidetracked itself with contract interpretation, and vague dictionary defi-
nitions.
21
 It appears the majority failed to look at the three examples pro-
vided by Congress to determine which apparatus qualify. Why else 
would Congress include the examples? Certainly not so courts could 
ignore them. The majority could have easily avoided its wild goose chase 
to satisfy congressional intent since congressional intent is seemingly 
clear in the statute. Congress made an affirmative choice to include three 
specific examples of apparatus in its definition of “playground.”
22
 The 
inclusion of these examples strongly suggests Congress’s intent and 
eliminates the need for courts to extrapolate from dictionary definitions.  
Second, the Tenth Circuit’s decision to rely on a dictionary’s defini-
tion of the word “apparatus” was a poor decision and created an unneces-
sary and convoluted detour to its holding. Definitions of words are help-
ful when they make the meaning of a word clear. However, the definition 
for the word “apparatus” adopted by the West court was not clear. The 
West court adopted, “a collection or set of materials, instruments, [or] 
appliances . . . designed for a particular use,” as the definition for the 
word “apparatus.”
23
 This definition widened the spectrum of things that 
qualify as an “apparatus.”
24
 Even the concurrence agreed that the defini-
tion did nothing to prevent a toy truck, for instance, from being included 
as an “apparatus,” even though it is absurd.
25
 Again, this was not what 
Congress intended when it included specific examples of apparatus in the 
statute because the specific examples in the statute provide a context to 
understand the word “apparatus.”
26
 The definition adopted by the West 
court cancelled out this context and rendered the examples meaningless.  
  
 20. 21 U.S.C. § 860(e)(1) (2006). 
 21. West, 671 F.3d at 1200-01. 
      22. 21 U.S.C. § 860(e)(1) (2006). 
      23. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 102 (1981). 
 24.  Id. 
 25. 
 
West, 671 F.3d at 1203 (Lucero, J., concurring). 
 26. See 21 U.S.C. § 860(e)(1) (2006). The examples include: sliding boards, swingsets, and 
teeterboards. 
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Also, Congress defined “playground,” and it defined “children,” but 
it did not define “apparatus.”
27
 One reason why Congress may have de-
cided to not define the word “apparatus” is because Congress expected 
courts to infer the meaning of “apparatus” from the examples listed in the 
statute and not to go hunting for vague definitions.
 
 The court should not 
have relied on a dictionary’s vague definition of “apparatus.”
28
 
Third, the majority neglected to take into consideration generally 
accepted concepts of a playground. The City of Lawrence Parks and Rec-
reation Department’s website shows that parks and recreation experts do 
not consider Holcom Park a “playground.”
29
 This should be a factor a 
court considers when it determines whether a park is a “playground” 
within the meaning of the playground rule.  The Lawrence Parks and 
Recreation Department distinguishes playground equipment from other 
park amenities in its description of Holcom Park.
30
 According to the 
website, “[t]he amenities of [Holcom Park] include: tennis courts, wall 
handball courts, playground equipment, sand volleyball courts, basket-
ball court, restroom facilities, indoor recreation center, and a sports com-
plex (baseball fields).”
31
 Notice that the list distinguishes playground 
equipment, from the sports complex comprised of “baseball diamonds . . 
., concession area[, and an] athletic field.”
32
 Additionally, the officer who 
testified for the Government also distinguished the children’s area from 
the rest of Holcom Park.
33
 Neither the Lawrence Parks and Recreation 
Department nor the officer considered the sports fields to be a similar 
apparatus to those in the playground area.  
The last reason why the West majority should have ruled in favor of 
the defendant is because most of the amenities in Holcom Park are used 
by people of all ages.
34
 Essentially, the majority ignored the phrase “ap-
paratus intended for recreation of children,” in the playground rule’s 
  
      27. See id. at § 860(c). 
      28. Different dictionaries define the same word in different ways. For example, apparatus is 
defined in one dictionary as “[t]he things collectively necessary for the performance of some activity 
or function; the equipment used in doing something.” SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 99 
(2002). However, in a different dictionary, apparatus is defined as “[a] group or combination of 
instruments, machinery, tools, or materials having a particular function.” RANDOM HOUSE 
WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 66 (1992).  
      29. Holcom Park, CITY OF LAWRENCE, KAN. PARKS AND RECREATION DEP’T, 
http://www.lawrenceks.org/lprd/parks/holcompark (last visited Oct. 4, 2012). 
      30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33.  
Holcom Park is . . . a city park complex that includes . . . four baseball fields, two soccer 
fields, two tennis courts, . . . two handball courts, a volleyball court and a covered area 
for picnics and then a children’s park area with . . . a jungle-gym apparatus and another 
set of swings, and then a jungle-gym apparatus that sits next to the first one connected by 
a bar that you could swing across.  
United States v. West, 671 F.3d 1195, 1196 (10th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added) (quoting the officer’s 
testimony). 
       34.   CITY OF LAWRENCE, KAN. PARKS AND RECREATION DEP’T, supra note 29. 
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definition of “playground.” The primary intent of the swingset and jungle 
gym in Holcom Park is recreation for children.
35
 The rest of the ameni-
ties are intended for the recreation of all ages and not just “for the recrea-
tion of children.” This suggests that the park is not just a place where 
children gather but a place where adults gather as well. Congress did not 
intend to increase punishment for selling drugs near places where people 
of all ages gather when it enacted the playground rule.
36
 The majority 
should not have ruled that a baseball field with a backstop qualifies as an 
“apparatus” because a baseball field is used by people of all ages.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Again, the West majority should have ruled in favor of the defend-
ant because it ignored plain statutory language, introduced an ambiguous 
definition of “apparatus,” failed to take into consideration generally ac-
cepted concepts of a playground, and ignored the fact that the amenities 
in Holcom Park are not intended solely for the recreation of children. 
These factors seemingly suggest that the West court’s analysis is flawed. 
While the author of this Comment disagrees with the West court’s legal 
analysis, the West court reached the right result. Congress intended the 
playground rule to eliminate the presence of drugs in protected areas by 
discouraging transactions near places where children gather. Children 
undoubtedly gather at Holcom Park, and therefore, the defendant in West 
should receive an enhanced punishment for dealing drugs near the park. 
Despite a poorly written statute and flawed legal analysis, the Tenth Cir-






 35. See 21 U.S.C. § 860(e)(1) (2006) (apparatus must be “intended for the recreation of chil-
dren”). 
 36. See id. Sections 841(a)(1) and 856 address the issue of selling drugs near a place where 
people of all ages gather.  
 * University of Denver Sturm College of Law J.D. Candidate 2014; University of Rich-
mond, B.A. 
 
